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BANKRUPTCY-PROVABLE CLAIMS-UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES FOR FRAUD OF
PARTNER.-Through the fraud of its agent, a partnership sold to the peti-
tioners drafts and checks which were not paid. The drafts and checks were
not signed nor negotiated by either partner but their proceeds were used in
the partnership business. The petitioners' claim against the bankrupt firm was
proved and allowed. They also filed proof of claim for damages due to the
fraud against each partner's individual bankrupt estate. Held, that the claim
against the individual estates was properly disallowed, because claims based
on mere torts are not provable, and double proof is not permissible when the
partners individually receive no unjust enrichment beyond what occurs to the
firm. Schall et al. v. Camors et al. (Jan. 5, 1920) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term.
igig, No. 84.
This important decision by the court of final authority puts to rest two much
mooted controversies. The first was whether clause b of section 63 of the
Bankruptcy Act merely provides the procedure for liquidating claims of the
classes declared provable by clause a, or whether it had the further effect of
admitting all unliquidated claims including torts. The federal courts generally
have adopted the former view. See Collier, Bankruptcy (iith ed. 1917) 976.
But the opposing argument, strengthened by the contention that the 1903 amend-
ment to section 17 amounts to a legislative construction that tort claims are
provable, was somewhat difficult to meet. Cf. Brown v. United Button Co.
(I9O6, C. C. A. 3d) 149 Fed. 48. The opinion in the instant case leaves nothing
further to be said on the subject. Of course, where the tort may be waived
and an action brought in quasi-contract, a provable claim exists. Tindle v.
Birkett (I9O6) 205 U. S. 183, 27 Sup. Ct. 493. The second mooted point was
whether, when the tort was waived, double proof could be made against the
partnership and the individual partners' bankrupt estates on the theory of joint
and several liability. Cf. In re Coe (igio, C. C. A. 2d) 183 Fed. 745 (allowing
double proof) ; cf. Reynolds v. New York Trust Co. (1911, C. C. A. Ist) i88
Fed. 61I (disallowing it). If, as in the present case, the individual partners
receive no enrichment beyond that which accrued to the firm, the rejection of
double proof appears clearly to accord with the distinction between firm and
individual debts recognized by section 5. Whether proof against the partner-
ship would preclude a suit in tort against the partners is a question upon which
the authorities are not in accord. See (i919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 409.
CORPORATIONS-MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-INVALID BONDs-LIAILITIES TO
HoLDERs-A city made contracts for improvements and issued bonds under a
statute which was later held unconstitutional. The defendant purchased some
of these bonds in good faith and sold them to the plaintiff, who sued the
defendant to recover the purchase price. The city was joined as a party
defendant. Held, that the plaintiff should recover from the defendant; and
that the defendant should recover from the city. City of Henderson v. Redinan
(Igig, Ky.) 214 S. W. 809.
Bonds issued by a municipal corporation under an unconstitutional statute
are invalid. Norton v. Shelby County (1886) 118 U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121;
Wilkes County v. Call (1898) 123 N. C. 308, 31 S. E. 481. If the municipality
has no power to make the attempted contract, and if a recovery of the benefits
received would increase the burden of the taxpayers, no recovery can be had,
either under the contract or in quasi-contract. McDonald v. Mayor, etc., of
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New York (1876) 68 -N. Y. 23; South Covington Dist. v. Kenton Water Co.
(1904) 117 Ky. 489, 78 S. W. 420. Hence, where the invalid bonds were given
to the contractor for work done pursuant to an ultra vires contract, the holder
had no remedy against the city. Cohen v. City of Henderson (i9i8) 182 Ky.
658, 207 S. V. 4. Generally, if recovery by the plaintiff seems mere restitution
of what the municipality has unlawfully received, recovery is allowed in quasi-
contract. Long v. Lemoyne Borough (19o8) 222 Pa. 311, 71 At. 211; Butts
County v. Jackson Banking Co. (19o8) 129 Ga. 8ol, 6o S. E. 149. But, by the
weight of authority, money paid for unauthorized municipal bonds cannot be
recovered, because payment of the purchase price with interest would accom-
plish the prohibited purpose-namely, a loan to the city for interest. Litchfield
v. Ballou (1884) 114 U. S. 190, 5 Sup. Ct. 820; Cawker v. Central Bitulithic
Paving Co. (1909) 140 Wis. 25, 121 N. WV. 888. These decisions seem to be
based on an erroneous conception of the nature of a quasi-contract. The instant
case, in reaching the opposite conclusion, is supported by some authority. Paul
v. City of Kenosha (867) 22 Wis. 266, 94 Am. Dec. 598; Brown v. City of
Atchison (1888) 39 Kan. 37, 17 Pac. 465. And it is submitted to be the better
view. It would seem that neither sound public policy nor an adequate protec-
tion of the taxpayers should require such an inequitable result as would follow
from holding that a city is not under duty to repay funds which have been paid
into its treasury for a consideration which has failed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-EFFECT OF STATE REGULA-
TIONS-VIDTH OF CAR PLATFORMS.-The Public Service Commission of Penn-
sylvania ordered the defendant railway company to comply with the state law
and equip the last car on certain of its trains with a thirty-inch platform. On
the defendant's refusal to so equip its mail trains moving in interstate business,
action was brought and judgment was granted in the state court for the
plaintiff. The defendant appealed on the ground that the state law violated
the commerce clause of the federal Constitution. (Art. I, sec. 8.) Held, that
the judgment be reversed, because this was a matter requiring uniformity of
regulation, and because national regulation had already gone so far as to
exclude state action. Clark, J., dissenting. Penn. R. R. v. Public Service
Commnission of Pennsylvania (1919, U. S.) 40 Sup. Ct. 36.
The power to regulate commerce is plenary and action by Congress within
that power is supreme. Gibbons v. Ogden (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. I. Even
state action in aid of the federal regulation is ineffective. Southern Railway
v. Railroad Commission of Indiana (1915) 236 U. S. 439, 35 Sup. Ct. 304. And
even where no action has been taken by the federal government, if the subject
is one requiring uniformity of treatment, no state may pass laws concerning
the same. Hall v. DeCuir (1877) 95 U. S. 485. But in matters not requiring
uniformity, state regulation is permissible until Congress acts. Cooley v. Board
of Wardens (I85I, U. S.) 12 How. 299. These general rules are not now
subject to question, but their application to particular sets of facts is difficult.
In the principal case certain regulations of. the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion relating to cabooses on freight trains were considered as a national regu-
lation which excluded state regulation in the matter of end cars on fast mail
trains. The national act might have been deemed limited, allowing state action
in the untouched field. Cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Georgia (1914) 234
U. S. 280, 34 Sup. Ct. 829. The other ground of the decision in the principal
case was that the width of car platforms is a matter requiring uniformity.
Yet it has been held that a state may regulate the type of headlight to be used.
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Georgia, supra. Or the state may regulate the
manner in which passenger trains shall be heated. New York, N. H. & H. R. R.
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v. New York (1897) 165 U. S. 628, 17 Sup. Ct. 418. Or the state may prescribe
the number of men to be employed in operating trains. Chicago, R. I. & Pac.
Ry. v. Arkansas (91I) 219 U. S. 453, 31 Sup. Ct. 275. The decision in the
principal case, while open to some doubt, if placed alone on either of the two
grounds, is difficult to question when placed on both together.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NATIONAL BANKS-DISCOUNT IN ADVANCE-EFFECT
OF STATE DECISIONS ON UsuRY.-The defendant, a national bank doing business
in the State of Georgia, had deducted interest in advance at the rate of eight
per cent. on several loans made to the plaintiffs. The National Banking Act,
Rev. St. sec. 5197, provides that a national bank may charge "interest at the
rate allowed by the laws of the state." This action was brought to recover twice
the amount of the interest paid, on the ground that a charge of eight per cent.
collected in advance was usury according to the law of Georgia as interpreted
by its highest court. Held, that the plaintiffs should not recover. Pitney,
Brandeis, and Clarke, JJ., dissenting. Evans v. National Bank of Savannah
(1919, U. S.) 40 Sup. Ct. 58.
Deducting interest in advance at the rate of eight per cent. has been held
to be usury in Georgia. Loganville Banking Co. v. Forrester (1915) 143 Ga.
302, 84 S. E. 961. That ruling is supported in only a few jurisdictions. See
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Carpenter (1883) 40 Oh. St. 26o. The prevailing rule is
that a deduction in advance of the highest legal rate of interest is not usury.
Fleckner v. United States Bank (1823, U. S.) 8 Wheat. 338; Bank of Newport
v. Cook (1895) 6o Ark. 288, 30 S. W. 35; Cobe v. Guyer (igog) 237 Ill. 516,
86 N. E. 1071. However, some states restrict the practice by statute to short
term paper. Covington v. Fisher (1908) 22 Okla. 207, 97 Pac. 615 (one year).
In no case has the taking of a lesser rate of interest deducted in advance been
held to-be usury. See National Life Ins. Co. v; Donovan (1909) 238 Ill. 283,
87 N. E. 356. The interesting point of the principal case is that the Supreme
Court refused to follow the decision of the Georgia court in its interpretation
of the state law. The majority rely on dicta expressed in cases deciding that
the National Banking Act fixes the penalty to be enforced against a national
bank for usury. Farmers, etc., National Bank v. Dearing (1875) 91 U. S. 29,
32; Haseltine v. Central National Bank of Springfield (1901) 183 U. S. 132,
22 Sup. Ct. 51. It was not necessary to those decisions to say that the state
law had no other effect than to fix the rate of interest. But even so, it seems
that it was not intended that the National Banking Act was to adopt only
the mere language of the several state statutes as being the rate of interest
"allowed by the laws of the state" and to allow separate national and state
interpretation in each case as to what that language should mean. The whole
purpose was to put national and state banks on the same footing with respect
to usury. And it has been held that the state interpretation of what consti-
tutes usury under its laws must apply to national banks. Union National Bank
v. Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. (1896) 163 U. S. 325, 16 Sup. Ct. 1039. So a state
decision that its statutes forbade compounding interest, as usury, was enforced
as national law in an action against a national bank. Citizens" National Bank v.
Donnell (19o4) 195 U. S. 369, 25 Sup. Ct. 49. It is difficult to see how the
principal case can be supported either on reason or authority.
COURTS-JURISDICTION-SuITS BETWEEN NON-RESIDENT CORPORATINs.-The
plaintiff and defendant were corporations organized under the laws of Maine.
Each conducted mining operations in Arizona and had a place of business in
Massachusetts. Two suits in equity were brought in Massachusetts, one to
recover for ore wrongfully mined from the plaintiff's veins, and the second to
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obtain reimbursement for the expense of pumping the defendant's mine, as
provided by an Arizona statute. Held, that the court could not assume juris-
diction. Arizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co. (igg, Mass.)
124 N. E. 281.
Citizens of sister states are entitled, under the privileges and immunities
clause of the federal Constitution, to sue in state courts on so-called "transitory"
causes of action arising elsewhere, if citizens of the state are so entitled. State
ex rel. Prall v. District Court (1914) 126 Minn. 5o, 148 N. W. 463; Ward
v. Maryland (1870, U. S.) x2 Wall. 418. However, since a corporation is not
a citizen within the meaning of this provision, the refusal to take jurisdiction
in the principal case was not improper. Paul v. Virginia (x868, U. S.) 8 Wall.
168. But states may limit the jurisdiction of their own courts so as to bar
certain forms of actions or classes of litigants. Robinson v. Oceanic Steam
Nay. Co. (1889) 112 N. Y. 315, i N. E. 625; see Chambers v. Baltimore &
Ohio R. R. (1907) 207 U. S. 142, 148, 28 Sup. Ct. 34, 35. And, subject to the
above constitutional limitation, courts may refuse to take jurisdiction of
"transitory" actions between non-residents if they are against the public policy
of the state. See Howarth v. Lombard (19oo) 175 Mass. 570, 573, 56 N. E.
888, 889 (rights created by statute of a sister state); The Belgenland (1885)
114 U. S. 355, 363, 5 Sup. Ct. 86o, 865 (collision on high seas between foreign
vessels). So if complete justice cannot be done, or if the parties are put to
unnecessary hardships, jurisdiction will be declined. National Telephone Mfg.
Co. v. DuBois (1896) 165 Mass. 117, 42 N. E. 5io; see (1918) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 190. Courts of equity especially should and sometimes do look to
the difficulties involved, as in the instant case, where the cause of action
occurred and most of the witnesses resided in Arizona. But a provision in a
contract that only a designated forum shall be the place of suit will ordinarily
be disregarded as attempting to oust the court's jurisdiction. Ibid. It is sub-
mitted that, though the conclusion is sound, a more valid reason than non-
residence existed, for courts may on principles of equity refuse to assume
jurisdiction of "transitory" actions, if a proper trial or remedy cannot be
afforded.
DAMAGES-COMPROMISE VERDCt.-In an action for damages to the plaintiff's
hearse there was undisputed evidence that the repairs on it cost the plaintiff
approximately $18o, and that after being repaired, it was worth less than before
the collision with the defendant's street car. The jury returned a verdict for $1.
Held, that a new trial should be granted, as the amount of the verdict was con-
clusive evidence of an improper compromise. F. & B. Livery Co. v. Indianapolis
Traction & Terminal Co. (I919, Ind. App1.) i24 N. E. 493.
A verdict should represent the result of conscientious reflection by the entire
jury upon the law as directed and the evidence in the case. Ottawa v. Gilliland
(19Ol) 63 Kan. I65,. 65 Pac. 252; Williams v. Pressler (19O1) ii Okla. 122,
65 Pac. 934. And arriving at their ultimate conclusion by lottery, or the tossing
of a coin, will vitiate the verdict. Mitchell v. Ehle (1833, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) io
Wend. 595; Beakley v. Optimist Printing Co. (1915) 28 Ida. 67, 152 Pac. 212.
Likewise, if there is a previous agreement that the amount of the verdict shall
be the quotient obtained by adding the amounts which each juror allows and
dividing the aggregate sum by the number of jurors. Campbell v. Brown (1911)
85 Kan. 527, 117 Pac. IOO; Carter v. Marshall Oil Co. (1919, Iowa) 17o N. W.
798. But where there is no previous agreement to be bound by the result, a
quotient verdict is valid. City of Columbus v. Ogletree (1897) 1O2 Ga. 293,
29 S. E. 749; Hoover v. Town of Mapleton (19oo) i1O Iowa, 571, 81 N. W.
776. So the vitiating fact is the previous agreement to be bound by the
result, not the fact that the verdict is the result of a compromise. And where
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the damages are not liquidated and the jurors differ as to the amount, a
verdict which is the result of a compromise is unobjectionable. Bryson v.
Chicago, B. & 0. Ry. (1894) 89 Iowa, 677, 57 N. W. 430. Hamilton v. Oswego
Waterworks (Igoo) 163 N. Y. 562, 57 N. E. iiii. But where the amount of
the verdict cannot be justified upon any hypothesis to be drawn from the evi-
dence, but represents the result of a compromise-in order to reach a verdict
at all-between the jurors who are in favor of a verdict for the plaintiff and
the jurors who are in favor of a verdict for the defendant, it will be set aside.
New Home Sewing Machine Co. v. Simon (igoo) 107 Wis. 368, 83 N. W. 649;
Alden v. Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. (1917) 137 Minn. 16i, 163
N. W. 133. The result reached in the instant case is clearly correct, but, as
most verdicts are more or less a matter of compromise-and are not invalid
on that account-it is submitted that the decision should rest squarely on the
theory of inadequate damages. Cf. Tathwell v. City of Cedar Rapids (I9o3)
122 Iowa, 50, 97 N. W. 96; cf. Toledo Rys. & Light Co. v. Mason (igio) 8I
Oh. St. 463, 91 N. E. 292. It would seem, where the damages are liquidated,
that the ground of insufficient damages is identical with that of a verdict
contrary to the evidence.
EVIDENcE-HEARSAY-STATEMENTS THROUGH INTERPRETER.-Proceedings for
disbarment were instituted against the defendants on the ground of misrepre-
sentations to their clients. During the proceedings the clients were permitted
to testify as to the representations, which were made in the English language
and understood by the clients through the translations of an interpreter whom
they had brought at the direction of the defendant. Held, that the evidence
was properly admitted. In re Coburn (I919, Mich.) 174 N. W. 134.
It is clear that words which a witness has understood only by the transla-
tion of another are hearsay. And the general rule is that the witness cannot
therefore testify as to what was said. People v. Lee Fat (880) 54 Calif. 527.
This is true, even if the testimony is as to what was said at a previous trial
or examination, and is based on a stenographic report. State v. Terline (1902)
23 P. I. 530, 51 Atl. 204; but see Fabrigas v. Mostyn (1773, K. B.) 20 How.
St. Tr. 82, 123. It has been held that it is immaterial that the interpreter
testified as to the accuracy of his original translation. People v. John (1902)
137 Calif. 22o, 69 Pac. io63. But there is reason to doubt the soundness of
this decision, as the effect of it would be to prevent the admission of any
testimony given at a previous trial unless remembered or noted by the inter-
preter. See Wigmore, Evidence (905) sec. 751, note. Some cases, on the
theory that the interpreter at a trial is himself a witness, admit testimony as
to his statements, if he is dead, or sick, or otherwise so situated that his
declarations at a former trial would be admitted. Schearer v. Harber (1871)
36 Ind. 536. However, there is one main exception to the above rules, and
on it the instant case is based-that if a trty selects an interpreter for his
communication, that interpreter is his agent, and the interpreter's words are to
be regarded prima facie as his own. Commonwealth v. Vose (1892) 157 Mass.
393, 32 N. E. 355. Obviously in a trial, examination, or investigation, where
there is an official interpreter, the theory of agency cannot apply. See Sharp
v. Mclntire (1896) 23 Colo. 99, 46 Pac. 115. But in the determination of the
terms of a contract the rule is often applied, and there the interpreter can
be regarded as either an automaton or an agent. McCormicks v. Fuller (I88I)
56 Iowa, 43; but see Diener v. Diener (1856) 5 Wis. 483, 527. And in the
case of admissions or confessions, testimony as to what was said through an
interpreter is likewise permitted. Commonwealth v. Vose, supra. Since the
application in the case of contracts is analogous to that in the case of admis-
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sions and confessions, and is most frequent in the latter, these rules are
generally discussed under admissions by text writers. See Wigmore, Evidence
(19o5) sec. 18io; Chamberlayne, Evidence (i9ii) sec. I35o; Jones, Evidence
(Horwitz ed. 1913) sec. 265. But it is clear that the statements to be testified
to need not on principle be admissions, and courts have permitted the intro-
duction of testimony as to what was said through an interpreter in order to
impeach the credibility of witnesses. Meacham v. The State (1903) 45 Fla.
71, 33 So. 983; cf. People v. Jailles (i9o5) 146 Calif. 3oi, 79 Pac. 965.
EVIDENCE-JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A CITY ORDINANCE ON APPEAL.-The defendant
was convicted in the Municipal Court of Chicago of a violation of a city
ordinance, the judge taking judicial notice of the ordinance. The defendant
appealed without making the ordinance a part of the record by a bill of excep-
tions. Held, that the Supreme Court could not take notice of the ordinance,
even though the Municipal Court had done so. City of Chicago v. Lost (1919,
Ill.) 124 N. W. 58o.
It is the general rule that a municipal court must take judicial notice of the
ordinances of the municipality wherein its jurisdiction lies. State v. Fulco
(1914) 135 La. 269, 65 So. 239; Portland v. Yick (1904) 44 Ore. 439, 75 Pac.
706; contra, City of St. Louis v. Young (91) 235 Mo. 44, 138 S. W. 5. But
a state court, upon the original trial of a case, will not take judicial notice
of ordinances, nor will a court which has a dual jurisdiction, municipal and
state, when it is acting in the latter capacity. State v. Pinyan (1915) 17 Ariz.
123, 149 Pac. 316; People v. Quider (1912) 172 Mich. 280, 137 N. W. 546. An
interesting situation arises where there is an appeal to a state court from a
municipal court which has judicially noticed an ordinance. The cases on the
point fall into three classes. The first class, of which the principal case is
an example, hold that the appellate court will not notice the ordinance, and
that it must be incorporated in the record on appeal. Thomas v. State (1915)
13 Ala. App. 421, 69 So. 413; Porter v. City of Thomasville (0915) 16 Ga.
App. 313, 85 S. E. 283; Karchmer v. State (1911) 61 Tex. Cr. Rep. 221, 134
S. W. 700. This is the weight of authority and may be justified on grounds
of policy. A state court could hardly be expected to take cognizance of the
vast mass of poorly collected and poorly reported legislation turned out by
the law-making bodies of numerous cities, towns, and villages. The second
class of cases hold that the appellate court must take notice of the ordinance
if the municipal court did so. Sidelsky v. Atlantic City (1913, Sup. Ct.) 84
N. J. L. 198, 86 Atl. 531; City of Milbank v. Cronlokken (1912) 29 S. D. 46,
135 N. W. 711; Village of Minnesota v. Martin (1914) 124 Minn. 498, 145
N. W. 383 (by statute). This view seems more logical and is analogous to
the rule that the power of the Supreme Court of the United States to take
judicial notice is co-extensive with the power of the court from which appeal
is taken. Cf. Hanley v. Donoghue (1885) 116 U. S. 1, 6 Sup. Ct. 242. The
third class of cases hold that if the appellate court is trying the case de novo,
it must notice whatever the municipal court noticed, but that if the appellate
court is reviewing the case, it will not take notice. Foley v. State (1894) 42
Nebr. 233, 6o N. W. 574; Steiner v. State (1907) 78 Nebr. 147, IIO N. W. 723;
cf. Portland v. Yick, supra. It is submitted that in view of the disorderly and
unsystematized condition of municipal records, the principal case represents
the best rule, although it seems wrong in theory, and although it offers a fatal
trap to an unwary attorney for the appellant.
PLEADING - ACCOUNT STATED - GENERAL DENIAL - EVIDENCE. - The plaintiff
brought an action upon an account stated. The defendant entered a general
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denial and offered evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered
by the plaintiff. Held, that such evidence was admissible to rebut the implica-
tion of a promise to pay. Clare v. Kelley (ii, .Sup. Ct.) 177 N. Y. Supp. 212.
It is generally said that an account stated will be deemed conclusive between
the parties, unless fraud, mistake, or omission is alleged and proved. Commer-
cial Electrical Supply Co. v. M11eysenberg (19oo) 85 Mo. App. 337. Following
this doctrine, testimony concerning the quality of the goods sold, which was the
basis of an account stated, has been excluded. Tabor Coal & Supply Co. v.
Cohen (1914) 189 Ill. App. i9o. However, the court in the instant case arrived
at a contrary conclusion, and it is submitted rightly so, both on principle and
authority. An account stated presupposes a subsisting debt, hence any facts
tending to destroy the plaintiff's claim ought to be admitted under a general
denial. Mayer Coal Co. v. Stallsmith (1913) 89 Kan. 8i, 129 Pac. 831. So the
previous transactions between parties may be investigated to ascertain whether
or not the relationship of debtor and creditor ever existed. See Cooper v.
Upton (i9o6) 6o W. Va. 648, 657, 64 S. E. 523, 527. And it is competent for
the defendant to prove the payments made before the time when the complaint
alleges an account was stated. Kaminsky v. Mendelson (1898, Sup. Ct.) 25
Misc. 500, 54 N. Y. Supp. ioio. Some courts have gone even further in deter-
mining the prior existence of the account which was stated, and under a general
denial have usually allowed the introduction of any facts or circumstances which
would tend to show the inherent improbability of the defendant's agreement to
such an account. Coffee v. Williams (1894) 103 Calif. 550, 37 Pac. 504; Baker
v. Griffin (1904, Sup. Ct.) 43 Misc. I, 86 N. Y. Supp. 579. In accord with this
rule, the defendant in the principal case was permitted to show the nature and
value of the services rendered, not for the purpose of diminishing the recovery,
but as evidence that no account was stated. Such evidence is relevant and has
a logical bearing upon the probability of the occurrence of the transaction which
the plaintiff claims resulted in the creation of the new liquidated debt.
PROPERTY-DEDICATIoN-ACcEPTANCE-RECORDING PLAT.-A tract of land was
platted by its owner upon a map, designating certain portions as streets and
highways. The map was filed and recorded, though the street was never used
or formally accepted. Sometime thereafter, the plaintiff and the predecessor of
the defendant's grantor acquired the land on either side of the disputed street by
deed, but no specific reference was made to the map. The plaintiff remained in
possession of his land and the street until ousted by the defendant's grantor,
who conveyed lots 2 and 3, as indicated on the recorded map, to the defendant.
The plaintiff brought ejectment against the defendant, who claimed title, as an
abutting land owner, to the center of this street. Held, that !he plaintiff should
recover, since the dedication had never been accepted and, therefore, the defend-
ant's deed carried no title to the street. Elliott v. McIntosh (1919, Calif.) 183
Pac. 692.
By the doctrine of dedication, a private owner by informal action is enabled
to create a legal power in the public to vest in itself title in his land. See
Elliott, Roads & Streets (3d ed. x911) ch. v. This has usually been based upon
the theory of estoppel, though text writers have voiced much opposition to this,
on the ground that in many cases the general public has not altered its position
in reliance on the offer. See Pittsburg, etc. Ry. v. Crom Point (1898) 15o Ind.
536, 550, 5o N. E. 741, 745; Angell, Highways (3d ed. 1886) sec. 156. Dedica-
tion cannot be said to be in the nature of a grant, since it requires no writing
or definite grantee. Forney v. Calhoun County (1888) 84 Ala. 215, 4 So. 153.
Hence the rule would seem to be a mere anomaly that has grown up in the law
of conveyances. The great weight of authority requires the public to accept
YALE LAW JOURNAL
this offer, by user or otherwise, within a reasonable time in order to complete
the dedication. City of Venice v. Madison County Ferry Co. (i9o5) 216 Ill.
345, 75 N. E. io5. This seems not to have been done in the instant case. But
some courts hold that an acceptance of the tender of dedication is unnecessary
to make it irrevocable. See South Amboy v. New York, etc. R. R. (igoi, Ct.
Err.) 66 N. J. L. 623, 625, 5o Atl. 368, 369. However, when third persons have
acquired rights which would be impaired by revocation, or have made contracts
for valuable consideration founded on the supposed appropriation of the prop-
erty to the uses indicated, the offer is always irrevocable, regardless of accept-
ance by the public. Boise City v. Hon (19o8) 14 Ida. 272, 94 Pac. 167. So
dedication may be established by a sale of lots with reference to the grantor's
recorded map. Attorney General v. Onset Bay Grove Ass'n (1915) 221 Mass.
342, iog N. E. i65. Yet merely laying out grounds, without actually throwing
them open to use, or without selling the lots in reference to the plat, will not
generally constitute a dedication. See Hillmer Co. v. Beher (914) 264 Ill. 568,
58o, io6 N. E. 481, 486. And in the instant case, since the public failed to act
on the grantor's offer and no conveyance was made in view of the map, it is
submitted that the court rightly held that there was no valid dedication.
PROPERTY-ORAL CONTRACT-PART PERFORMANCE-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Pos-
sEssioN.-The plaintiff, having made an oral contract with the defendant for the
purchase of land, and being authorized to take possession, represented to the
tenant at will under the defendant, that he had bought the land and recorded the
deed. Thereupon the tenant attorned to the plaintiff, but on learning that the
contract for sale was oral, bought the land himself and recorded the deed. The
plaintiff brought an action for specific performance. Held, that the plaintiff
should have no relief, because his possession was not sufficient to avoid the effect
of the statute of frauds. Hambey v. Wood (i919, Calif.) 184 Pac. 9.
It is now well established in England and most American jurisdictions that
receiving or taking possession of land with acquiescence takes a sale out of the
statute of frauds. See I Ames, Cases in Equity Jurisdiction (9o4) 279, note.
In the instant case the plaintiff's possession was held insufficient to avoid the
operation of the statute, because it did not render him liable to an action of
trespass and did not clearly evidence the new ownership. These are two of the
various reasons used in attempts to explain the above exception, which was arbi-
trarily construed into the statute soon after it was passed. Cf. Butcher v.
Stapely (1685, Eng. Ch.) i Vernon, 363; see Maddison v. Alderson (1883,
H. L.) 8 App. Cas. 467, 489. But the result of the oral agreement in the present
case was to give the vendee a license or privilege to enter sufficient to bar the
action of trespass, if the plaintiff himself had entered, until revocation followed
by reasonable time to withdraw. See Glass v. Hulbert (1869) lO2 Mass. 24,
33. Thus the trespass doctrine would seem to be without force. There is
authority for the second reason of the decision, namely, that the new possession
must be of such a character as to evidence clearly a change of ownership. See
Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts (2d ed. 1897) sec. i2o. The ques-
tion whether or not possession is notice applies only where third parties are
affected. Possession normally is notice, but this is not the reason why the
possession takes the case out of the statute. Probably the reason why the mis-
conception arose that the taking of possession removed the case from the opera-
tion of the statute, was that the delivery of possession was considered as equiv-
alent to a conveyance, and therefore the contract was regarded as executed.
Cf. Butcher v. Stapely, supra. There being no third parties in interest in the
instant case it would seem that the doctrine of notice would not apply. It is
submitted that an attornment made and accepted in good faith and with the
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permission of the vendor should be a sufficient possession to come within the
exception. But in the present case, the plaintiff being guilty of fraud, the court
was justified in restricting the applicability of the arbitrary exception by holding
that the case was not within it.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-MEMORANDUM-POWER OF SOLICITOR TO GIVE MEMO-
RAND)Um-The plaintiff brought an action for the breach of an oral agreement
to sell to the defendant a quantity of goods exceeding ten 1. in value. The
defence was that there was no written memorandum of the agreement
signed by the party to be charged or his agent as required by statute. Sales
of Goods Act, 1893, sec. 4, 56 and 57 Vict. ch. 71. The plaintiff contended that
a letter, written by the counsel of the defendant to the plaintiff's counsel, in
which the former denied his client's liability and mentioned the latter's letters
to his client, was a sufficient memorandum-to satisfy the statute. Held, that
recovery should be denied. Thirkel v. Cambi (igig, C. A.) 121 L. T. Rep. 532.
The court decided that the alleged memorandum of the defendant's solicitor
was ineffective for two reasons: first, the letter did not contain the essential
terms of the contract and denied the plaintiff's allegations that the other letters,
referred to in the alleged memorandum, contained a contract; and second,
that the solicitor, instructed by his client to deny the contract, was not an agent
to make a memorandum of the agreement within the meaning of the statute.
A memorandum must state the contract with reasonable certainty so that the
substance can be understood from the writing itself or by direct reference
to some extrinsic instrument or writing, without recourse to parol proof.
Reid v. Kentworthy (1881) 25 Kan. 701; Ments v. Newwitter (1890) 122 N. Y.
491, 25 N. E. io44; cf. Stewart & Son v. Cook (1902) 118 Ga. 541, 45 S. E.
398. The fact that a letter repudiates any liability does not prevent it from
being a sufficient memorandum. For, if a letter repudiating liability contained,
with reasonable certainty, the essential terms of the contract, it is a sufficient
memorandum to satisfy such a statute. Leather Cloth Co. v. Hieronjmus (1875)
io Q. B. I4O; Wilkinson v. Evans (1866) I C. P. 407, 14 W. R. 963; Louisville
Asphalt Varnish Co. v. Lorick (1888) 29 S. C. 533, 8 S. E. 8. In the instant
case, the letters referred to in the alleged memorandum showed that there had
been a parol modification of an essential term of the agreement; and the
plaintiff had no written acknowledgment of what that change was. Conse-
quently, the contents of the letter of the defendant's solicitor did not satisfy
the statute. See (1914) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 470. Two judges went further
and said that even if the contents of the letter were sufficient, the memorandum
would be invalid because the solicitor had no authority to make such a memo-
randum. The statute requires that the memorandum be made by the party to
be charged or his agent in that behalf. However, one who possesses a general
agency sufficiently comprehensive in its terms, has the power to sign a memo-
randum binding upon his principal. Browne, Statute of Frauds (5th ed. 1895)
sec. 370. It has been held that a general agent for the sale of goods had the
power to give a purchaser a memorandum effective under the statute. Potter
v. Springfield Milling Co. (1897) 75 Miss. 532, 23 So. 259. Where a solicitor's
scope of authority was similar to that of a general agent, it was held that he
could make a memorandum effective under the statute. John Griffiths Cycle
Corporation Ltd. v. Humber & Co. Ltd. (C. A.) [1899] 2 Q. B. 414; Daniel v.
Trefusis [1914] I Ch. 788. But where a solicitor was given special authority
only, like a special agent, and in violation of his authority signed a memo-
randum, it was inoperative under the statute. Smith v. Webster (1874) 3
Ch. 49; see Bushnell v. Beavan (1834, N. C.) I Bing. 103. In the instant case,
it was quite apparent that the solicitor was a special agent, and did not have
the power to make a memorandum binding on his principal under the statute.
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TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAXES-DEED OF TRUST RESERVING POWER OF REVO-
CATION NOT TAXABLE.-By the Illinois statute a tax is imposed "upon the
transfer of any property . . by deed . . . gift made in contemplation
of death of the grantor . . . or intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after such death." Several years before his death the grantor
voluntarily conveyed real estate to a trustee to manage the same, the income
to be paid to his children, the principal to be distributed upon the death of the
last survivor of them. The trust deed reserved to the grantor the power of
revocation. After his death, the state claimed a tax was due under the
Inheritance Tax Act above quoted. The lower court so ruled. Held, thel this
did not constitute a taxable "transfer." People v. Northern Trust Co. (1919,
IlI.) 124 N. E. 662.
It is well settled that a gift inter vivos made in contemplation of death, as
well as a technical gift causa mortis, is taxable under such a statute. People
v. Danks (1919, Ill.) 124 N. E. 625; Ross, Inheritance Taxation (1912) 159.
But the gift in the principal case is neither. The lower court apparently held
it taxable on the theory that the trust did not vest in possession or enjoyment
until the grantor's death because of the power of revocation reserved by him.
Evidence showed that this clause was inserted at the suggestion of the grantor's
attorney as a protection for the donees in case any of them proved to be
spendthrifts. The existence of a power of revocation can scarcely be deemed
to prevent the trust from vesting immediately. Until the power is exercised,
the trustee and the cestuis have all of the rights, privileges, powers, and
immunities which they would have if the clause had been omitted, except only
that they are subject to a liability to have these legal relations changed by
the exercise of the power and they lack an immunity that they shall not be
so changed. Of course, the grantor may reserve powers so extensive, with
respect to controlling the trustee and the use of the income, that the trust will
be held within the Tax Act. In re Bostwick (1899) 16o N. Y. 489, 55 N. E.
2o8; Bullen v. State (1916) 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473. Also, the principal
case expresses the warning that a deed manifestly intended to evade the payment
of inheritance taxes would furnish no protection in that regard.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAXES-TAXING NoN-RESIDENTS MORE THAN RESI-
DENTS.-The New Jersey Inheritance Tax Law imposes a tax, graduated
according to the value of the property and the relationship of the beneficiary,
on the transfer by will or intestacy of certain kinds of property within the
state belonging to a non-resident decedent; and provides that "if all or any
part of the estate of such decedent, wherever situated, shall pass to per-
sons . . . taxable under this act," the tax to be assessed shall "bear the
same ratio to the entire tax which the said estate would have been subject
to under this act if such non-resident decedent had been a resident of this
state and all his property, real and personal, had been located within this state,
as such taxable property within this state bears to the entire estate, wherever
situated." James McDonald and James J. Hill, non-resident decedents, left
large estates consisting partly of stock in New Jersey corporations and partly
of realty and personalty in other states. By reason of the graduation of the
tax, the application of the apportionment formula resulted in imposing a
greater tax on the transfer of the New Jersey stock than would have been
imposed upon the transfer of an equal amount in similar manner of a resident
decedent. Held (three justices dissenting), that the taxes were valid. Maxwell
v. Bugbee and Hill v. Bugbee (1919) 40 Sup. Ct. 2.
That New Jersey may impose a tax upon the right granted by statute to
the executor or administrator of a non-resident decedent to succeed to property
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having its situs within the state was not questioned. The attack was made
upon the method of assessment, which, by reason of the apportionment formula,
resulted in a greater tax upon the transfer of the New Jersey stocks than
would have been assessed if the stock has passed from a resident decedent.
This was assailed, under the federal Constitution, as, first, giving residents
"privileges and immunities" denied to non-residents; second, denying to non-
residents the equal protection of the laws; and third, violating the due process
clause by taxing the transfer of real estate located outside New Jersey. The
majority opinion rejected the first contention with a summary reference to
authorities; it overruled the second on the ground that classification between
estates of resident and non-resident decedents is reasonable, and that absolute
equality between the two classes is not required by the equal protection clause;
it declares, as to the third, that the tax is levied upon the transfer of property
within the state's jurisdiction, the property outside being merely used in the
apportionment formula as a measure of the tax. See (1919) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 802. The minority, on the other hand, speaking through Mr. Justice
Holmes, asserts that increasing the tax by taking account of property outside
the state is in effect taxing such property-which is beyond the state's power.
He also appears to agree with the first contention of the plaintiffs in error.
It is hard to see why granting to residents the privilege and power to bequeath
New Jersey property free from payment of the larger tax, while denying
the same privilege and power to non-residents, is not in violation of Art. 4,
sec. 2, of the federal Constitution. See Cooley, Constitutional Limitations
(7th ed. 19o3) 569. The decision is another illustration of how far a state
may go in discriminating against citizens of other states without running
counter to constitutional prohibitions. See (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 6oi.
Apart from the question of discrimination the New Jersey law has features
both desirable and undesirable. If adopted in all states, for both residents and
non-residents, it would lead to a very fair apportionment of the tax-returns
from estates. But when combined with the prevailing system in other states,
it offers fertile field for double levy.
TAXATION-JOINT BANK ACCOUNT- TRANSFER AT DEATH OF ONE JOINT
OWNER.-One Stella Bigelow deposited money in the name of "Stella Bigelow
or Caroline Bigelow, either or survivor." Caroline died. The state instituted
proceedings to collect a tax on the ground that there had been a taxable trans-
fer under section 220 of the Tax Law. Held, that the whole account should be
taxed. It re Bigelow's Estate (1919, Surr. Ct.) 177 N. Y. Supp. 847.
The crucial question in the case was whether or not there was any "transfer."
When Stella made the joint deposit, there was created in Caroline a privilege
and a power to draw on the account to any amount, a liability to become sole
owner of the account should Stella die first, and an immunity from the exercise
by Stella of any dominion over the account except her own privilege and power
to draw. All these legal relations died with Caroline. They were not trans-
ferred from Caroline to Stella in the ordinary sense: that where Caroline had
possessed certain rights, privileges, powers, and immunities, Stella then
acquired precisely similar relations-as would have happened had Caroline willed
to Stella a house or a horse or a bank account. As it was, Caroline's death
killed her own rights, privileges, etc., but created in Stella no new legal rela-
tions. For example, Caroline's privilege and power to draw on the account did
not "pass" to Stella. Although Stella acquiredI nothing, she did benefit to the
extent that her disadvantageous no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities died simul-
taneously with Caroline's privileges, powers and immunities. The court, without
reasoning, denominated such a change of legal relations a taxable transfer.
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Cases in accord with this view usually go on the ground that a joint account is
in the nature of a gift which is incomplete until the death of the donor. Matter
of Durfee (1913, Surr. Ct.) 79 Misc. 655, 14o N. Y. Supp. 594; Matter of von
Bernuth (1913, Surr. Ct.) 143 N. Y. Supp. 672; Matter of Kline (igo9, Surr. Ct.)
65 Misc. 446, 121 N. Y. Supp. logo. And it will be observed that once a joint
account has been created, the death of the donor and that of the donee have
precisely similar effects. On the contrary, it has been held that the gift was
complete at the date of the creation of the account; hence that there was no
transfer when one joint owner died. Matter of Tilley (915, Sup. Ct.) 166 App.
Div. 24o, 151 N. Y. Supp. 79; McDougald v. Boyd (1916) 172 Calif. 753, 159 Pac.
168; Attorney General v. Clark (1915) 222 Mass. 291, iO N. E. 299. It is sub-
mitted that the latter view is preferable. Undoubtedly, the death of one of the
parties produced a change of legal relations which was beneficial to the survivor,
but it was not the kind of change which is fairly denoted by the word "transfer."
The situation in these cases is clearly distinguishable from a revocable trust
where, prior to the death of the settlor, the cestui que trust has no immediately
beneficial legal relations such as the privilege and power possessed by the joint
owner of a bank account. In such a case, the death of the settlor produces a
genuine transfer. Bullen v. State of Wisconsin (igi6) 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup.
Ct. 473.
TORTS-ANIMALS IN HIGHWAY-LIABILITY OF OWNER.-The defendant's horse,
while at large on a highway in front of the defendant's premises, was run
into by the plaintiff's automobile without negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
He sued to recover the damage to the automobile. It was not shown to be
unlawful by any town by-law for a horse to be at large in the public ways of
the town; nor was there evidence that the defendant knowingly permitted the
horse to be at large on the night of the accident. Held, that the plaintiff should
not recover. Dyer v. Mudgett (igi, Me.) 107 Atl. 831.
It is well settled that where it is shown affirmatively that the owner of a
domestic animal had knowledge that the animal was vicious, he is under a
duty to pay damages for any injury done by it. Roos v. Loeser (1gig, Calif.
App.) 183 Pac. 204, and see (1915) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 514. But where the
owner has no such knowledge he is under no such duty, if the animal was
rightfully where the damage was done. Dix v. Somerset Coal Co. (1914) 217
Mass. 146; Clowdis v. Fresno Flume & Irrigation Co. (1897) I18 Calif. 315,
5o Pac. 373. But it is generally held that if the owner was not privileged to
allow his animal to be at the place of damage, he is under such a duty regard-
less of scienter. Hardiman v. Wholley (1899) 172 Mass. 411, 52 N. E. 518;
Stern v. Hoffman Brewing Co. (I899, Sup. Ct.) 26 Misc. 794, 56 N. Y. Supp.
188; see also 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 691, note. The owner of lands abutting upon
a public highway generally owns the fee to the center thereof. Huffinan v.
State (1899) 2r Ind. Apl. 449, 52 N. E. 713; see City of Houston v. Finnigan
(9o5, Ct. Civ. App.) 85 S. W. 470, 471. And such an owner may make any
reasonable use of that land, subject only to the easement of the public. Farns-
worth v. City of Rockland (1891) 83 Me. 508, 22 Atl. 394; King v. Norcross
(19o7) 196 Mass. 373, 82 N. E. 17. By the weight of authority the mere fact
that a domestic animal was in the highway does not place on the owner an
unconditional duty to pay money damages for all injuries that may have
accidentally resulted therefrom. But there may be situations where it would
be culpable to permit animals to occupy the highway. Even then, it would
seem that the owner would be "liable" only if the animal was there through
his negligence. See Holden v. Shattuck (1861) 34 Vt. 336, 343, 344, 8o Am.
Dec. 684, 686, 687. In the principal case there was no trespass and therefore
no unconditional duty to pay damages for the resulting injuries, but present-
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day traffic conditions would seem to demand that such a duty be created even
in the absence of a technical trespass; and might well be imposed by the
court, even in the absence of a statute.
TORTS-LABILITY OF WIFE FOR DEATH CAUSED BY HER AUTOMOBILE DRIVEN BY
HUSBAND.-This was an action against the defendant and her husband for
the death of the plaintiff's intestate caused by the negligent operation of the
defendant's automobile by her husband while engaged in his own pursuits.
She had purchased this automobile in her own name for the use and pleasure
of herself and the members of her family. Held, that the plaintiff should not
recover. Smith v. Weaver (igig, Ind. App.) 124 N. E. 503.
There seems to be a square conflict of authority upon the problem involved
in the principal case. Some courts hold that mere ownership of an automobile
does not render a father liable for injuries to another due to the negligent
operation of that vehicle by a minor son in furtherance of the son's own
pleasure or business. Hays v. Hogan (1917) 273 Mo. I, 200 S. W. 286; Lemke
v. Ady (1916, Iowa) 159 N. W. iolI; see (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 327.
Or that a husband is not liable for injuries caused by his wife's negligent opera-
tion of his automobile while engaged in her own pursuits. Mast v. Hirsh (1918)
199 Mo. App. I, 202 S. W. 275; Lewis v. Steele (x16) 52 Mont. 300, 157 Pac.
575; Reynolds v. Buck (igo5) 127 Iowa, 6oi, 1O3 N. W. 946. The increasing
weight of authority seems to be that when a motor car is maintained by the
pater familias for the general use and convenience of his family, he is liable
for the negligence of a member of the family having general authority to
drive it, while the car is being used as a family car. Smith v. Jordan (I912)
211 Mass. 269, 97 N. E. 761; McNeal v. McKain (1912) 33 Okla. 449, 126 Pac.
742. Some courts deny that in this class of cases there exists any relationship
of master and servant. Hays v. Hogan, supra; see (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 621. While other courts, where the car is maintained solely or partly
for the use and pleasure of the family, regard the member of the family while
operating the car for his own use and pleasure, as the servant of the owner.
See (1915) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 347. Where there are several members of
the owner's family riding in the automobile at the time of the accident, the
courts have found no difficulty in holding the owner liable, on the ground that
the car is being used for the purppse for which it was provided. McNeal v.
McKain, supra; cf. Bourne v. Whitman (1911) 209 Mass. 155, 95 N. E. 404.
The doctrine of the principal case seems to put a premium on the owner's
failure to employ and provide a competent chauffeur to drive his family. See
Birch v. Abercrombie (1913) 74 Wash. 486, 496, 133 Pac. IO2O, 1O24.
TRUSTS-TRusTEE AND EXECUTOR-TAXATION.-The defendants were appointed
"executors of and trustees under" the will of Flagler, which directed the pay-
ment of debts and legacies and created a trust of the residue. In 1913 the
defendants qualified as executors in Florida-the domicile of the testator;
thereafter they paid all debts and legacies, and from time to time transferred
the property, which consisted of corporate stock and bank deposits, to their
domicile in New York, charging the same on their books to themselves as
trustees. The State of Florida assessed the property for 1916 taxes at the
domicile of the decedent, against the defendants as "trustees." Suit to collect
the tax was dismissed, despite the State's contention that "trustees" was mere
descriptio personae and that the defendants as "executors" were liable for the
taxes. Held, that such dismissal was proper, because the property had passed
by operation of law to the defendants as trustees. State v. Beardsley (1919,
Fla.) 82 So. 794.
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Intangible personal property in the hands of an executor or administrator is
taxable at the domicile of the decedent or at the place where administration
was granted. Commonwealth v. Williams (19o4) lO2 Va. 778, 47 S. E. 867;
Cornwall v. Todd (1871) 38 Conn. 443. But such property held by a trustee is
taxable at the latter's domicile. Guthrie z. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. (1893)
I58 Pa. 433, 27 At. io52; Walla Walla v. Moore (1897) 16 Wash. 339, 47 Pac.
753. Allowing the State's contention that the word "trustee" was merely
descriptive and synonymous with "executor," it became important to find at
what point of time the property really vested in the trustee as such. Many
cases have held that where bonds are required, a surety on an executor's bond
is not released until a trustee's bond has been given. White v. Ditson (1885)
140 Mass. 351, 4 N. E. 6o6. In many jurisdictions an accounting plus an order
of distribution by the Probate Court is necessary to authorize an executor to
hold the devised property as trustee. Re Estate of Higgins (1895) 15 Mont.
474, 39 Pac. 5o6; Roach's Estate (1907) 50 Ore. 179, 92 Pac. 118. So where an
executor has authority conferred by the will to sell land, a contract to sell
could not be avoided unless the executor had been authorized by the court to
hold as trustee. Jones v. Broadbent (1912) 21 Ida. 555, 123 Pac. 476. The pre-
ceding cases turn partly on statutes. But independently of statute, the reason-
ing has been that where the duties of the executor are to continue as executor
in the remainder of the estate, there must have been some distinct act of appro-
priation to give rise to the. trust. So an executor will be liable as executor for
an investment which, although proper as a trust, is not clearly marked as such.
Miller v. Congdon (1859, Mass.) 14 Gray, 114; Sheffield v. Parker (1893) x58
Mass. 330, 33 N. E. 5O1; see Alston v. Munford (1814, C. C. D. Va.) i Brock.
266, I Fed. Cas. No. 267. An executor will no longer be held liable as executor
where he has transferred property to his co-executor as trustee under the will.
Anderson v. Earle (1877) 9 S. C. 46o. The transfer was held a distinct act of
appropriation. While an accounting is the best evidence of such an appropria-
tion, still there must have been an actual separation of the funds to the trust
use. In re McDowell et al. (1916, Surr. Ct.) 97 Misc. 3o6, 163 N. Y. Supp. 164;
cf. Story's Adm'r v. Hall (1912) 86 Vt. 31, 83 Atl. 653. On the other hand,
where all duties as executor have been completed and the time for a final
accounting has long since passed, it has been held that the executor became by
operation of law liable as trustee to the cestui que trust named in the will.
Wooden v. Kerr (1892) 91 Mich. 188, 51 N. W. 937. And the executor has been
held in such a case'to be no longer liable as executor. State v. Cheston and
Carey (1879) 51 Md. 352. And after the duties as executor are completed,
though there has been no final accounting, and though there has been no formal
transfer of the funds by the executor to himself as trustee, the income will be
held payable to the cestui que trust. Fenton v. Hall (19o8) 235 Ill. 552, 85 N. E.
936. In such a case, only conduct as trustee gives rise to the trust and entitles
the trustee to sue as such on notes due. Goodsell v. McElroy Bros. Co. (1912)
86 Conn. 402, 85 Ati. 5o9. Therefore, it seems that so long as executorial duties
are to continue, there must be some unequivocal appropriation to the trust before
an executor may hold as trustee. But as soon as such duties are completed,
if it is not a prerequisite that a trustee's bond be given or an order of court
secured the property may be said to be held by the executor as trustee by opera-
tion of law.
WILLS-IMPLIED REVocATIoN BY CONVEYANcE.-The testatrix made a devise of
her homestead to the defendant, then later conveyed the same to him by deed.
The deed was invalid because of lack of the husband's signature. The husband
prayed that the devise be decreed revoked. Held, that the decree be not issued,
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because the subsequent ineffective conveyance to the devisee did not revoke the
devise. Caine v. Barnwell (igig, Miss.) 82 So. 65.
It is generally stated that the conveyance of realty previously devised revokes
the will pro tanto. Webster v. Webster (I87O) 105 Mass. 538; Moore v. Smith
(I916) 191 Mich. 694, I58 N. W. 148; Ostrander v. Davis (iII, C. C. A. 8th)
191 Fed. 156. The purchase money, in case of a sale, goes as personalty.
Stender v. Stender (914) 18I Mich. 648, 148 N. W. 255. The reason of this
rule is that the law treats such conveyance as a change of intention inconsistent
with the will, which has the effect of working a revocation by implication.
So a contract to convey, even though subsequently rescinded, has been held to
have this effect. Walton v. Walton (1823, N. Y.) 7 Johns. Ch. 258, II Am. Dec.
456, note. But a sale made by one not competent is held to manifest no such
operative change of intention and not to effect a revocation. Bethany Hospital
Co. v. Philippi (19io) 82 Kan. 64, io7 Pac. 530. A valid conveyance to the
devisee of the same land previously devised is within the rule, and held to be
a revocation pro tanto. Johnson v. Hayes (1913) 139 Ga. 218, 77 S. E. 73;
Phillippe v. Clevenger (19o9) 239 Ill. 117, 87 N. E. 858. And even an ineffectual
deed to a third party revokes a devise. In re Gensimore's Estate (914) 246
Pa. 216, 92 Atl. 134. Likewise, an ineffectual conveyance to the devisee mani-
fests an intention opposed to the property passing by will, and on the above
reasoning might be held a revocation. Cf. Kean's Will (z839, Ky.) 9 Dan. 25;
cf. Beard v. Beard (1744, Eng. Ch.) 3 Atk. 72. Where the deed is set aside
because procured by fraud or undue influence the intention, though inconsistent
with the will, is inoperative as a revocation because "vitiated by the fraud."
Graham v. Burch (189i) 47 Minn. 171, 28 Am. St. Rep. 339, note. Implied revo-
cation was abolished in England by the Wills Act in 1837. Ford v. DePontes
(i86r, Eng. Ch.) 30 Beav. 572. In states having similar legislation no convey-
ance has any effect except in so far as it actually withdraws property from
under the operation of the will. And so if land devised be conveyed to another
and reconveyed to the testator, it passes by will on his death. Ridenour v. Calla-
han (19o6) 29 Oh. Cir. Ct. 65. Such seems to be a sensible rule. Some states
hold that a deed to a devisee is not a revocation but may be an ademption.
Gregory v. Lansing (igir) 115 Minn. 73, 131 N. W. 1oio. Others provide, by
statute, that a deed is a revocation unless not inconsistent with the devise. In
re Benners Estate (igog) i5 Calif. 153, 99 Pac. 715. The exception established
in the principal case constitutes an illogical exception to an illogical and often
unjust doctrine. The intention is just as much opposed to the property passing
by will in this case as in any other. However, where the doctrine of implied
revocation prevails this exception is becoming established. Aubert's Appeal
(1885) iog Pa. 447, I At. 336. With the prevalence of statutes allowing
after acquired realty to pass by will, the entire doctrine of implied revocation
should be ignored as applied to defective conveyances. Cf. Woodward v. Wood-
ward (i9o5) 33 Colo. 457, 81 Pac. 322.
